Given the continuing discussion about the Supreme Court’s decision to overrule Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, we thought that a review of the decision (and its limits) is in order.
The Loper Bright decision
The 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice Roberts launched a full-throated attack on deference to administrative agencies: “Chevron gravely erred”; it “required judges to disregard their statutory duties”; it is “fundamentally misguided,” “impressionistic and malleable.” The Court concluded: “Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.”
Starting with first principles, the Court explained that the judiciary interprets the law. That tradition persisted through the New Deal, the Court recounted, when decisions like Skidmore v. Swift & Co. permitted agency deference based only on the “power to persuade.” The Court framed Chevron v. NRDC as a departure from that tradition by sometimes insisting on deference to agency interpretations. When a statute is “silent or ambiguous,” Chevron required courts “to defer to the agency if it had offered ‘a permissible construction of the statute.’” The majority criticized that rule as unworkable, as shown by subsequent efforts to clarify the standard (like US v. Mead Corp’s “step-zero” analysis) that “only added to Chevron’s unworkability, transforming the original two-step into a dizzying breakdance.”
